What is Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?

TL;DR

This paper critically examines aim-oriented empiricism, a proposed new conception of science, by analyzing sixteen objections to its validity and exploring its philosophical implications.

Contribution

It provides a detailed critical analysis of the arguments against aim-oriented empiricism and discusses its potential impact on science and philosophy.

Findings

Identifies sixteen objections to aim-oriented empiricism.

Offers critical responses to these objections.

Highlights the significance of aim-oriented empiricism for scientific philosophy.

Abstract

For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, the conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny.