Dynamics of Human Cooperation in Economic Games
Martin Spanknebel, Klaus Pawelzik

TL;DR
This paper models human decision-making in economic games, showing that simple learning dynamics can explain diverse behaviors and deviations from rationality observed in experiments.
Contribution
It introduces a basic learning model that accounts for the variety of human cooperation and decision patterns in repeated prisoner dilemma games.
Findings
Reproduces suppression of cooperation against extortionists
Explains increased cooperation with generous opponents
Predicts evolution of individual cooperation over time
Abstract
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner dilemma games humans do not always optimize their mean reward and frequently exhibit broad distributions of cooperativity. The reasons for these failures of maximization are not known. Here we show that the dynamics resulting from the tendency to shift choice probabilities towards previously rewarding choices in closed loop interaction with the strategy of the opponent can not only explain systematic deviations from 'rationality', but also reproduce the diversity of choice behaviours. As a representative example we investigate the dynamics of choice probabilities in prisoner dilemma games with opponents using strategies with different degrees of extortion…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis
