Mechanism Design via Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition
Salman Fadaei

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel linear programming approach using Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition to simultaneously find optimal fractional allocations and their integer decompositions in mechanism design, improving efficiency and solution quality.
Contribution
It proposes a unified linear program solved via Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition for optimal fractional points and their integer decompositions in mechanism design.
Findings
Efficient solution method for fractional and integer decompositions.
Application of Dantzig-Wolfe and Benders decompositions.
Tight convex decompositions based on Carathéodory's theorem.
Abstract
In random allocation rules, typically first an optimal fractional point is calculated via solving a linear program. The calculated point represents a fractional assignment of objects or more generally packages of objects to agents. In order to implement an expected assignment, the mechanism designer must decompose the fractional point into integer solutions, each satisfying underlying constraints. The resulting convex combination can then be viewed as a probability distribution over feasible assignments out of which a random assignment can be sampled. This approach has been successfully employed in combinatorial optimization as well as mechanism design with or without money. In this paper, we show that both finding the optimal fractional point as well as its decomposition into integer solutions can be done at once. We propose an appropriate linear program which provides the desired…
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Taxonomy
TopicsConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
