Non-Payoff Monotonic Dynamics in an Evolutionary Game of Courtship

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new evolutionary game model for human courtship strategies, revealing non-payoff monotonic dynamics that lead to complex evolutionary patterns, supported by numerical and analytical analysis.

Contribution

It presents a novel evolutionary coordination game modeling human courtship, highlighting non-payoff monotonic dynamics not seen in traditional models.

Findings

Dynamics are non-payoff monotonic.

Complex strategy evolution observed.

Numerical and analytical validation provided.

Abstract

We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by self-esteem, turns out to be non-payoff monotonic. This property gives rise to nontrivial evolution in the players' strategies, which we study both numerically and analytically.