Symmetry restoration by pricing in a duopoly of perishable goods
Su Do Yi, Seung Ki Baek, Guillaume Chevereau, and Eric Bertin

TL;DR
This paper extends a duopoly model of perishable goods by adding a pricing mechanism, revealing a new oscillatory market phase and demonstrating how prices influence symmetry restoration between sellers.
Contribution
The work introduces a simple price system into an existing satisfaction-based duopoly model, identifying an oscillatory phase and analyzing phase boundaries with mean-field approximations.
Findings
An oscillatory phase exists in the (T,g) parameter space.
Market symmetry is preserved at lower T with the price system.
Phase boundaries are estimated analytically and confirmed numerically.
Abstract
Competition is a main tenet of economics, and the reason is that a perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient in the absence of externalities and public goods. Whether a product is selected in a market crucially relates to its competitiveness, but the selection in turn affects the landscape of competition. Such a feedback mechanism has been illustrated in a duopoly model by Lambert et al., in which a buyer's satisfaction is updated depending on the {\em freshness} of a purchased product. The probability for buyer to select seller is assumed to be , where is the buyer's satisfaction and is an effective temperature to introduce stochasticity. If decreases below a critical point , the system undergoes a transition from a symmetric phase to an asymmetric one, in which only one of the two sellers is selected. In this…
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