Defensive Resource Allocation in Social Networks

TL;DR

This paper analyzes strategic resource allocation in social networks for competing marketing campaigns, using game theory to determine optimal strategies for both incumbent and challenger in different information scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for optimal resource allocation in social networks considering both unknown and known challenger entry scenarios.

Findings

Characterizes optimal strategies for incumbent and challenger.

Provides analytical solutions for resource allocation in voter model networks.

Highlights the impact of information availability on strategic decisions.

Abstract

In this work, we are interested on the analysis of competing marketing campaigns between an incumbent who dominates the market and a challenger who wants to enter the market. We are interested in (a) the simultaneous decision of how many resources to allocate to their potential customers to advertise their products for both marketing campaigns, and (b) the optimal allocation on the situation in which the incumbent knows the entrance of the challenger and thus can predict its response. Applying results from game theory, we characterize these optimal strategic resource allocations for the voter model of social networks.