Impact of Preference and Equivocators on Opinion Dynamics with Evolutionary Game Framework

TL;DR

This paper explores how preference and equivocators influence opinion evolution using an evolutionary game framework, analyzing stability and equilibrium states through simulations and mathematical methods.

Contribution

It introduces two basic interaction models, BSO and BDO, to study opinion dynamics considering preference and equivocators within an evolutionary game theory framework.

Findings

Equilibrium states depend on the interaction mechanisms and parameters.

Stability analysis reveals conditions for consensus or disagreement.

Simulations confirm theoretical predictions of opinion evolution patterns.

Abstract

Opinion dynamics, aiming to understand the evolution of collective behavior through various interaction mechanisms of opinions, represents one of the most challenges in natural and social science. To elucidate this issue clearly, binary opinion model becomes a useful framework, where agents can take an independent opinion. Inspired by the realistic observations, here we propose two basic interaction mechanisms of binary opinion model: one is the so-called BSO model in which players benefit from holding the same opinion; the other is called BDO model in which players benefit from taking different opinions. In terms of these two basic models, the synthetical effect of opinion preference and equivocators on the evolution of binary opinion is studied under the framework of evolutionary game theory (EGT), where the replicator equation (RE) is employed to mimick the evolution of opinions. By means of numerous simulations, we show the theoretical equilibrium states of binary opinion dynamics, and mathematically analyze the stability of each equilibrium state as well.