Belief and Truth in Hypothesised Behaviours
Stefano V. Albrecht, Jacob W. Crandall, Subramanian Ramamoorthy

TL;DR
This paper explores how beliefs about hypothesised behaviors influence decision-making in multi-agent systems, addressing belief correctness, payoff maximisation, and methods to verify hypotheses during interactions.
Contribution
It introduces three methods for incorporating evidence into beliefs, analyzes their correctness, and demonstrates how prior beliefs affect long-term payoff optimisation in AI systems.
Findings
Beliefs can be correct or fail depending on evidence incorporation methods.
Prior beliefs significantly influence long-term payoff maximisation.
Automated statistical analysis can verify hypothesised types during interaction.
Abstract
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviours. The idea is to hypothesise a set of types, each specifying a possible behaviour for the other agents, and to plan our own actions with respect to those types which we believe are most likely, given the observed actions of the agents. The game theory literature studies this idea primarily in the context of equilibrium attainment. In contrast, many AI applications have a focus on task completion and payoff maximisation. With this perspective in mind, we identify and address a spectrum of…
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