Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces new algorithms and hardness results for computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential games, enhancing understanding of leader-follower strategic interactions.

Contribution

It provides novel exact and approximate algorithms, along with complexity results, for finding Stackelberg equilibria in extensive-form games.

Findings

New exact algorithms for Stackelberg equilibria

Approximate algorithms with performance guarantees

Hardness results indicating computational difficulty

Abstract

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken in favor of the leader). We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential games (or extensive-form games) and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for several classes of these sequential games.