A note on the security of the hHB protocol
Carl L\"ondahl

TL;DR
This paper presents a polynomial-time attack on the hHB protocol, demonstrating that it does not meet its claimed security guarantees, using the GRS attack as the basis.
Contribution
It introduces a novel polynomial-time attack on the hHB protocol, revealing its vulnerabilities and challenging its security claims.
Findings
The hHB protocol is vulnerable to the GRS attack.
The proposed attack efficiently compromises the protocol's security.
The results question the reliability of hHB for secure applications.
Abstract
We propose a polynomial-time attack on the hHB protocol, showing that the protocol does not attain the claimed security. Our attack is based on the GRS attack.
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Taxonomy
TopicsRFID technology advancements · Advanced Authentication Protocols Security · Cryptography and Data Security
