Building a Good Team: Secretary Problems and the Supermodular Degree
Moran Feldman, Rani Izsak

TL;DR
This paper extends the secretary problem to arbitrary non-negative monotone functions under matroid constraints, using supermodular degree to achieve better approximation guarantees for functions that are not submodular.
Contribution
It introduces algorithms parametrized by supermodular degree for secretary problems with general functions, providing polynomial approximation guarantees.
Findings
Algorithms with polynomial guarantees based on supermodular degree
Extension of secretary problem to non-submodular functions
Analysis of approximation bounds in new model
Abstract
In the Secretary Problem, one has to hire the best among n candidates. The candidates are interviewed, one at a time, at a random order, and one has to decide on the spot, whether to hire a candidate or continue interviewing. It is well known that the best candidate can be hired with a probability of 1/e (Dynkin, 1963). Recent works extend this problem to settings in which multiple candidates can be hired, subject to some constraint. Here, one wishes to hire a set of candidates maximizing a given set function. Almost all extensions considered in the literature assume the objective set function is either linear or submodular. Unfortunately, real world functions might not have either of these properties. Consider, for example, a scenario where one hires researchers for a project. Indeed, it can be that some researchers can substitute others for that matter. However, it can also be that…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Search Problems · Auction Theory and Applications · Cryptography and Data Security
