On the Inefficiency of the Merit Order in Forward Electricity Markets with Uncertain Supply
Juan M. Morales, Salvador Pineda

TL;DR
This paper examines the economic inefficiency of the traditional merit-order dispatch in electricity markets with uncertain supply, proposing alternative co-optimized market mechanisms to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
Contribution
It introduces analytical formulas for co-optimized two-stage markets and proposes enhanced variants that improve merit-order efficiency under supply uncertainty.
Findings
Stochastic market clearing can break the merit order under certain conditions.
Virtual bidding and centralized dispatch can improve merit-order adherence.
Co-optimization reduces expected system operating costs.
Abstract
This paper provides insight on the economic inefficiency of the classical merit-order dispatch in electricity markets with uncertain supply. For this, we consider a power system whose operation is driven by a two-stage electricity market, with a forward and a real-time market. We analyze two different clearing mechanisms: a conventional one, whereby the forward and the balancing markets are independently cleared following a merit order, and a stochastic one, whereby both market stages are co-optimized with a view to minimizing the expected aggregate system operating cost. We first derive analytical formulae to determine the dispatch rule prompted by the co-optimized two-stage market for a stylized power system with flexible, inflexible and stochastic power generation and infinite transmission capacity. This exercise sheds light on the conditions for the stochastic market-clearing…
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