Latent Belief Theory and Belief Dependencies: A Solution to the Recovery Problem in the Belief Set Theories
Ryuta Arisaka

TL;DR
This paper introduces an enriched latent belief theory with dependencies to address the AGM recovery postulate's paradox, maintaining logical closure while providing a novel solution to the recovery problem in belief set theories.
Contribution
It extends the latent belief theory with belief dependencies, offering a new approach to solve the recovery paradox while preserving logical closure.
Findings
Enriched latent belief theory handles belief visibility dependencies.
The theory maintains logical closure but lacks the recovery property.
Provides a theoretical solution to the AGM recovery paradox.
Abstract
The AGM recovery postulate says: assume a set of propositions X; assume that it is consistent and that it is closed under logical consequences; remove a belief P from the set minimally, but make sure that the resultant set is again some set of propositions X' which is closed under the logical consequences; now add P again and close the set under the logical consequences; and we should get a set of propositions that contains all the propositions that were in X. This postulate has since met objections; many have observed that it could bear counter-intuitive results. Nevertheless, the attempts that have been made so far to amend it either recovered the postulate in full, had to relinquish the assumption of the logical closure altogether, or else had to introduce fresh controversies of their own. We provide a solution to the recovery paradox in this work. Our theoretical basis is the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Semantic Web and Ontologies
