Secret Key Agreement with Large Antenna Arrays under the Pilot Contamination Attack
Sanghun Im, Hyoungsuk Jeon, Jinho Choi, and Jeongseok Ha

TL;DR
This paper proposes a secret key agreement protocol for multi-user systems with large antenna arrays, effectively mitigating pilot contamination attacks by exploiting the relation between signal strengths at eavesdroppers and users.
Contribution
It introduces a novel estimator for eavesdropper channel gain and a rate-adaptation scheme to secure key sharing under pilot contamination attacks.
Findings
The scheme leverages large antenna arrays to detect information leakage.
The proposed method effectively secures key agreement against PCA.
Extensive evaluations confirm the scheme's robustness and efficiency.
Abstract
We present a secret key agreement (SKA) protocol for a multi-user time-division duplex system where a base-station (BS) with a large antenna array (LAA) shares secret keys with users in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. In the system, when the BS transmits random sequences to legitimate users for sharing common randomness, the eavesdroppers can attempt the pilot contamination attack (PCA) in which each of eavesdroppers transmits its target user's training sequence in hopes of acquiring possible information leak by steering beam towards the eavesdropper. We show that there exists a crucial complementary relation between the received signal strengths at the eavesdropper and its target user. This relation tells us that the eavesdropper inevitably leaves a trace that enables us to devise a way of measuring the amount of information leakage to the eavesdropper even if PCA…
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