On the Security of MTA-OTIBASs (Multiple-TA One-Time Identity-Based Aggregate Signatures)

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the security of a new aggregate signature scheme called MTA-OTIBAS, proving its unforgeability under certain cryptographic assumptions in the random oracle model.

Contribution

The paper provides a formal security proof for a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme, establishing its unforgeability against adaptive attacks.

Findings

Proposed a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme

Proved scheme's existential unforgeability under co-CDH assumption

Security holds in the random oracle model

Abstract

In [3] the authors proposed a new aggregate signature scheme referred to as multiple-TA (trusted authority) one-time identity-based aggregate signature (MTA-OTIBAS). Further, they gave a concrete MTA-OTIBAS scheme. We recall here the definition of MTA-OTIBAS and the concrete proposed scheme. Then we prove that our MTA-OTIBAS concrete scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the co-CDH problem assumption.