Asymmetric evolutionary games

TL;DR

This paper extends evolutionary game theory to include ecological and genotypic asymmetries, revealing fundamental differences in evolutionary dynamics that are not captured by symmetric models.

Contribution

It introduces a comprehensive framework for modeling asymmetric interactions in evolutionary games, addressing real-world heterogeneity among players.

Findings

Asymmetric games differ significantly from symmetric ones in evolutionary outcomes.

Ecological and genotypic asymmetries influence the stability of strategies.

Differences between genetic and cultural evolution models are highlighted.

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.