Queueing Game For Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks

TL;DR

This paper models spectrum access in cognitive radio networks as a queueing game, analyzing user decisions, optimal strategies, and pricing, validated through simulations.

Contribution

It introduces a queueing game framework for spectrum access, deriving equilibrium, social optimization, and pricing strategies in cognitive radio networks.

Findings

Analytical derivation of equilibrium strategies

Optimal pricing strategy for service providers

Validation through simulation studies

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the problem of spectrum access decision-making for the Secondary Users (SUs) in the cognitive radio networks. When the Primary Users (PUs) are absent on certain frequency bandwidth, SUs can formulate a queue and wait for the Base Station (BS) to serve. The queue of the SUs will be dismissed if the PU is emerging in the system. Leveraging the queueing game approaches, the decision-making process of the SUs that whether to queue or not is studied. Both individual equilibrium and social optimization strategies are derived analytically. Moreover, the optimal pricing strategy of the service provider is investigated as well. Our proposed algorithms and corresponding analysis are validated through simulation studies.