Multidefender Security Games
Jian Lou, Andrew M. Smith, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

TL;DR
This paper explores multi-defender security games, analyzing equilibrium behavior and the impact of network interdependencies on strategic protection decisions in complex systems.
Contribution
It introduces new models and computational methods for analyzing multi-defender security games with interdependent targets, extending traditional single-defender models.
Findings
Defenders tend to over-protect targets, sometimes significantly.
The price of anarchy can be unbounded, increasing with defenders and targets.
Network structure influences security investment and failure propagation.
Abstract
Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems with only one defender, despite being part of a more complex system with multiple players. Furthermore, many real systems such as transportation networks and the power grid exhibit interdependencies between targets and, consequently, between decision makers jointly charged with protecting them. To understand such multidefender strategic interactions present in security, we investigate game theoretic models of security games with multiple defenders. Unlike most prior analysis, we focus on the situations in which each defender must protect multiple targets, so that even a single defender's best response decision is, in general, highly non-trivial. We…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Game Theory and Applications · Military Defense Systems Analysis
