Co-evolutionary dynamics of a host-parasite interaction model: obligate versus facultative social parasitism
Yun Kang, Jennifer Harrison Fewell

TL;DR
This study models the co-evolution of hosts and social parasites, revealing complex dynamics influenced by ecological feedbacks, obligate versus facultative parasitism, and trait variability, with implications for stability and extinction scenarios.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive co-evolutionary model incorporating ecological feedbacks, parasitism types, and functional responses, analyzing stability and evolutionary outcomes.
Findings
Multiple equilibria lead to rich dynamics and bi-stability.
Host and parasite strategies can result in local extinctions.
Trait variability can destabilize the system and induce arms-race dynamics.
Abstract
To examine the co-evolution of quantitative traits in hosts and parasites, we present and study a co-evolutionary model of a social parasite-host system that incorporates (1) ecological dynamics that feed back into their co-evolutionary outcomes; (2) variation in whether the parasite is obligate or facultative; and (3) Holling Type II functional responses between host and parasite, which are particularly suitable for social parasites that face time costs for host location and its social manipulation. We perform local and global analyses for the co-evolutionary model and the corresponding ecological model. In the absence of evolution, the facultative parasite system can have one, two, or three interior equilibria, while the obligate parasite system can have either one or three interior equilibria. Multiple interior equilibria result in rich dynamics with multiple attractors. The…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
