Extortion outperforms generosity in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma
Bin Xu, Yanran Zhou, Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng, Zhijian Wang

TL;DR
This study provides empirical laboratory evidence that extortionate strategies in the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma outperform generous strategies in terms of scores, supporting the theoretical predictions of Press and Dyson.
Contribution
First experimental validation of the Press-Dyson zero-determinant strategies showing extortion outperforms generosity against human players.
Findings
Extortionate strategies yield higher scores than generous strategies.
Human cooperation rates increase over time in both strategies.
Subjects learn to cooperate more to maximize their payoffs.
Abstract
Promoting cooperation is an intellectual challenge in the social sciences, for which the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) is a fundamental framework. The traditional view that there exists no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player can unilaterally control the share of the surplus has been challenged by a new class of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies raised by Press and Dyson. In particular, the extortionate strategies can subdue the opponent and obtain higher scores. However, no empirical evidence has yet been found to support this theoretical finding. In a long-run laboratory experiment of the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma pairing each human subject with a computer co-player, we demonstrate that the extortionate strategy indeed outperforms the generous strategy against human subjects. Our results show that the extortionate strategy achieves higher scores than the generous…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
