TPAD: Hardware Trojan Prevention and Detection for Trusted Integrated Circuits
Tony F. Wu, Karthik Ganesan, Yunqing Alexander Hu, H.-S. Philip Wong,, Simon Wong, Subhasish Mitra

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive hardware Trojan detection and prevention method applicable during IC testing and operation, using new design techniques and memory technologies to identify and mitigate a wide range of malicious modifications.
Contribution
It presents a novel approach that combines design techniques and memory technologies for effective Trojan detection and prevention across various stages of IC fabrication and operation.
Findings
Detects 99.998% of Trojans without detailed design knowledge
Prevents 99.98% of attacks utilizing design reverse-engineering
Minimal speed impact close to 0%
Abstract
There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan detection during IC testing, it is still possible for attacks to go undetected. Using a combination of new design techniques and new memory technologies, we present a new approach that detects a wide variety of hardware Trojans during IC testing and also during system operation in the field. Our approach can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis, place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. It can be applied to any digital system, and can be tuned for both traditional and split-manufacturing methods. We demonstrate its applicability for both ASICs and FPGAs. Using fabricated test chips with Trojan emulation capabilities and also using…
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