The Fallacy of Favoring Gradual Replacement Mind Uploading Over Scan-and-Copy

TL;DR

This paper argues that gradual in-place replacement and destructive scan-and-copy mind uploading are metaphysically equivalent in terms of preserving personal identity, challenging common distinctions in the debate.

Contribution

It provides a logical demonstration that these two seemingly different methods are actually equivalent in maintaining personal identity.

Findings

Gradual replacement and scan-and-copy are metaphysically equivalent.

Personal identity preservation does not depend on the method used.

Challenges the common distinction in mind uploading debates.

Abstract

Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.