Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence

TL;DR

This paper critically examines anti-functionalist views on consciousness in AI, highlighting tensions in integrated information theory and emphasizing the need for future AI development to assess consciousness.

Contribution

It offers a nuanced critique of anti-functionalist and IIT perspectives, advocating for a balanced scientific approach to AI consciousness without metaphysical assumptions.

Findings

Critiques anti-functionalist stance on AI consciousness

Highlights tensions in IIT's treatment of self-knowledge

Suggests awaiting AI development before ascribing consciousness

Abstract

This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, as well as bringing out tensions in IIT's treatment of self-knowledge. The aim, though, is neither to reject IIT outright nor to champion functionalism in particular. Rather, it is suggested that both ideas have something to offer a scientific understanding of consciousness, as long as they are not dressed up as solutions to illusory metaphysical problems. As for human-level AI, we must await its development before we can decide whether or not to ascribe consciousness to it.