Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks
Joan T. Matamalas, Julia Poncela-Casasnovas, Sergio G\'omez, Alex, Arenas

TL;DR
This study explores how strategic incoherence among individuals in multiplex networks influences cooperation in social dilemmas, revealing new microscopic behaviors and unexpected cooperation patterns across different game scenarios.
Contribution
It uncovers the role of strategy incoherence in multiplex networks and its impact on cooperation, including novel findings in the Harmony Game and other social dilemmas.
Findings
Incoherent players affect cooperation levels in multiplex networks.
Non-full cooperation observed in the Harmony Game on multiplex.
Higher-than-expected cooperation in some social dilemmas.
Abstract
Cooperation is a very common, yet not fully-understood phenomenon in natural and human systems. The introduction of a network within the population is known to affect the outcome of cooperative dynamics, allowing for the survival of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Recently, the introduction of multiplex networks has yet again modified the expectations for the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, compared to the monoplex case. However, much remains unstudied regarding other social dilemmas on multiplex, as well as the unexplored microscopic underpinnings of it. In this paper, we systematically study the evolution of cooperation in all four games in the plane on multiplex. More importantly, we find some remarkable and previously unknown features in the microscopic organization of the strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between cooperative dynamics in…
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