A Coalitional Game for Distributed Inference in Sensor Networks with Dependent Observations
Hao He, Pramod K. Varshney

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic framework for forming sensor coalitions in distributed inference tasks, leveraging statistical dependence to optimize performance while considering energy constraints.
Contribution
It develops a novel coalition formation game using copula-based dependence measures, balancing inference gains and energy costs in sensor networks.
Findings
Coalition size increases inference performance but also energy consumption.
The proposed merge-and-split algorithm achieves stable coalition structures.
Numerical results show the approach outperforms existing methods.
Abstract
We consider the problem of collaborative inference in a sensor network with heterogeneous and statistically dependent sensor observations. Each sensor aims to maximize its inference performance by forming a coalition with other sensors and sharing information within the coalition. It is proved that the inference performance is a nondecreasing function of the coalition size. However, in an energy constrained network, the energy consumption of inter-sensor communication also increases with increasing coalition size, which discourages the formation of the grand coalition (the set of all sensors). In this paper, the formation of non-overlapping coalitions with statistically dependent sensors is investigated under a specific communication constraint. We apply a game theoretical approach to fully explore and utilize the information contained in the spatial dependence among sensors to maximize…
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