Truthful Secretaries with Budgets
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi

TL;DR
This paper introduces truthful online auction mechanisms for agents with budgets and private types, achieving constant approximation ratios for revenue and welfare in dynamic, multi-unit settings, a novel contribution in online budgeted auctions.
Contribution
It presents the first truthful mechanisms for online auctions with budgeted agents, transforming offline mechanisms into online ones with approximation guarantees.
Findings
Achieves constant approximation for revenue in online settings.
Provides a truthful mechanism with constant approximation for liquid welfare.
Addresses the challenge of combining online dynamics with budget constraints.
Abstract
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit auctions with additive agents for the allocation of both divisible and indivisible items. For both settings, we devise truthful mechanisms that give a constant approximation with respect to the auctioneer's revenue, under a large market assumption. For divisible items, we devise in addition a truthful mechanism that gives a constant approximation with respect to the liquid welfare --- a natural efficiency measure for budgeted settings introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [ICALP'14]. Our techniques provide high-level principles for transforming offline truthful mechanisms into online ones, with or without budget constraints. To the best of our knowledge,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
