Application of the war of attrition game to the analysis of intellectual property disputes

TL;DR

This paper applies the war of attrition game theory to analyze intellectual property disputes in southeast Mexico, proposing free IP zones as a novel solution to piracy and infringement issues.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of Free Intellectual Property Zones (FIPZ) as a new sui generis regime to manage IP disputes and promote local innovation.

Findings

FIPZ can facilitate sharing and copying within local clusters.

Global and local interactions influence piracy dynamics.

Enforcement outside FIPZ can be effective for IP protection.

Abstract

In many developing countries intellectual property infringement and the commerce of pirate goods is an entrepreneurial activity. Digital piracy is very often the only media for having access to music, cinema, books and software. At the same time, bio-prospecting and infringement of indigenous knowledge rights by international consortiums is usual in places with high biodiversity. In these arenas transnational actors interact with local communities. Accusations of piracy often go both ways. This article analyzes the case of southeast Mexico. Using a war of attrition game theory model it explains different situations of intellectual property rights piracy and protection. It analyzes different levels of interaction and institutional settings from the global to the very local. The article proposes free IP zones as a solution of IP disputes. The formation of technological local clusters through Free Intellectual Property Zones (FIPZ) would allow firms to copy and share de facto public domain content for developing new products inside the FIPZ. Enforcement of intellectual property could be pursuit outside of the FIPZ. FIPZ are envisioned as a new type of a sui generis intellectual property regime.