Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey
Linyuan Zhang, Guoru Ding, Qihui Wu, Yulong Zou, Zhu Han, and Jinlong, Wang

TL;DR
This survey comprehensively reviews recent advances in Byzantine attack and defense strategies in cooperative spectrum sensing for cognitive radio networks, highlighting vulnerabilities, defense algorithms, and future research directions.
Contribution
It provides a detailed taxonomy of Byzantine attacks, analyzes attack-defense dynamics, and offers an in-depth tutorial on state-of-the-art defense schemes in CRNs.
Findings
Classified Byzantine attack behaviors and parameters.
Reviewed defense algorithms for homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios.
Identified key challenges and future research directions.
Abstract
The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a…
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