The Problem of Confirmation in the Everett Interpretation

TL;DR

This paper critiques the internal coherence of the Oxford school Everett interpretation, arguing it cannot account for empirical confirmation or reference to quantum entities within its framework.

Contribution

It demonstrates the incoherence of the Oxford Everett interpretation regarding empirical confirmation and evaluates existing approaches to the probability problem.

Findings

Everettian universe cannot provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics.

The interpretation fails to establish reference to quantum theoretical entities.

Existing Everettian probability solutions do not resolve the coherence issues.

Abstract

I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence.