Smale Strategies for Network Prisoner's Dilemma Games

TL;DR

This paper extends Smale's approach to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma from two players to N-player network games, using advanced mathematical frameworks like Blackwell's approachability and differential inclusions.

Contribution

It introduces a novel extension of Smale's strategies to N-player network games within a rigorous mathematical framework.

Findings

Extended Smale's strategies to N-player network games.

Applied Blackwell's approachability and differential inclusions.

Provided theoretical insights into multi-agent game dynamics.

Abstract

Smale's approach \cite{Smale80} to the classical two-players repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game is revisited here for $N$-players and Network games in the framework of Blackwell's approachability, stochastic approximations and differential inclusions.