A dynamic game on Green Supply Chain Management
Mehrnoosh Khademi, Massimiliano Ferrara, Bruno Pansera, Mehdi Salimi

TL;DR
This paper develops a dynamic Stackelberg game model to optimize CSR allocation among supply chain members, aiming to maximize profits and CSR levels in a multi-period decentralized setting.
Contribution
It introduces a hierarchical equilibrium solution for a multi-period dynamic game in a three-tier supply chain, integrating CSR considerations.
Findings
Identifies equilibrium points maximizing profits and CSR levels.
Demonstrates the effectiveness of the dynamic game model in supply chain management.
Provides insights into strategic CSR allocation in decentralized supply chains.
Abstract
In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of three-tier supply chain in decentralized state that is including supplier, manufacturer and retailer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of supply chain, we use Stackelberg game and we consider in this paper a hierarchical equilibrium solution for a two-level game. Specially, we formulate a model that crosses through multi-periods by a dynamic discreet Stackelberg game. We try to obtain an equilibrium point at where both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken by supply chains are maximized.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSupply Chain and Inventory Management · Sustainable Supply Chain Management · Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting
