Multi-partite squash operation and its application to device-independent quantum key distribution

TL;DR

This paper generalizes the squash operation to multi-partite measurements, enabling its application to a broader range of detectors in quantum key distribution, and improves the security proof and key rate of the Ekert protocol.

Contribution

It introduces a multi-partite squash operation, extending the security proof framework for quantum key distribution to more detector types.

Findings

Successfully applied to the Ekert 1991 protocol

Enhanced the key generation rate

Validated under assumptions of quantum mechanics and memoryless detectors

Abstract

The squash operation, or the squashing model, is a useful mathematical tool for proving the security of quantum key distribution systems using practical (i.e., non-ideal) detectors. At the present, however, this method can only be applied to a limited class of detectors, such as the threshold detector of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 type. In this paper we generalize this method to include multi-partite measurements, such that it can be applied to a wider class of detectors. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this generalization by applying it to the device-independent security proof of the Ekert 1991 protocol, and by improving the associated key generation rate. For proving this result we use two physical assumptions, namely, that quantum mechanics is valid, and that Alice's and Bob's detectors are memoryless.