Computing rational decisions in extensive games with limited foresight

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new class of extensive form games where players have limited foresight and can perform higher-order reasoning, along with a novel solution concept and an effective method to compute equilibria.

Contribution

It advances models of games with limited foresight by incorporating higher-order reasoning and proposing a new solution concept for more realistic game analysis.

Findings

Effective procedure to compute equilibria

Players can model opponents for better outcomes

Enhanced understanding of limited foresight in games

Abstract

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve upon existing models of games with limited foresight, endowing players with the ability of higher-order reasoning and proposing a novel solution concept to address intuitions coming from real game play. We analyse the resulting equilibria, devising an effective procedure to compute them.