Novel Side Channel Attacks in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution

TL;DR

This paper uncovers new classical side channel vulnerabilities at the quantum-classical boundary in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution, revealing security leaks that occur even without inter-party communication, challenging assumptions of protocol security.

Contribution

It identifies and analyzes classical side channel attacks at the quantum-classical interface in CVQKD, highlighting security vulnerabilities overlooked in existing protocols.

Findings

Classical attacks can leak information during the quantum-classical transition.

Security is compromised even without communication between parties.

The vulnerabilities are specific to CVQKD but suggest broader implications.

Abstract

Experimental Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have to consist of not only the unconditionally secure quantum transmission, but also a subsequent classical exchange that enables key reconciliation and error correction. There is a large body of work examining quantum attacks on the quantum channel, but here we begin to examine classical attacks to both the classical communication and the exchange as a whole. Linking together separate secure protocols can unexpectedly leak information to an eavesdropper, even if the components are unconditionally secure in isolation. Here we focus specifically on the join between quantum and classical protocols, finding that in just this crossing of the quantum-classical boundary, some security is always and unintuitively lost. This occurs with no communication between the separate parties. While this particular example applies to only Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD), it highlights the need to re-examine the way all individual protocols are actually used.