Probability, Logic and Objectivity - The concept of probability of Carl Stumpf

TL;DR

This paper argues that Carl Stumpf's interpretation of probability aligns with an objective Bayesian view, clarifying misconceptions and analyzing its relation to other contemporary and subsequent interpretations.

Contribution

It provides a detailed analysis of Stumpf's probability concept, clarifies its interpretation, and corrects misrepresentations by other philosophers.

Findings

Stumpf's probability is best understood as objective Bayesian.

Reichenbach, von Mises, and Kamlah's construals are shown to be unfair or incorrect.

The paper clarifies essential aspects of Stumpf's probability interpretation.

Abstract

We will show that Carl Stumpf's interpretation of the concept of probability is best understood as that of an objective Bayesian. First we analyse Stumpf's work in relation to that of his contemporary Johannes von Kries, and after that we will discuss various ways in which Stumpf's probability-concept has been construed. By showing that the construals of Stumpf's account by Hans Reichenbach, Richard von Mises and Andreas Kamlah are unfair - and at some points incorrect - we uncover the aspects that are essential to Stumpf's probability interpretation.