Coordination in State-Dependent Distributed Networks: The Two-Agent Case
Benjamin Larrousse, Samson Lasaulce, Mich\`ele Wigger

TL;DR
This paper characterizes the conditions under which two agents can coordinate actions in a state-dependent noisy communication setting, providing insights into optimal power control and the benefits of non-causal state knowledge.
Contribution
It offers necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic implementability of joint distributions in a two-agent coordination problem with state-dependent channels.
Findings
Feasible joint distributions fully characterize achievable payoffs.
Non-causal state information at Agent 1 enhances coordination performance.
Results apply to power control in interference channels and state-amplification problems.
Abstract
This paper addresses a coordination problem between two agents (Agents and ) in the presence of a noisy communication channel which depends on an external system state . The channel takes as inputs both agents' actions, and and produces outputs that are observed strictly causally at Agent but not at Agent . The system state is available either causally or non-causally at Agent but unknown at Agent . Necessary and sufficient conditions on a joint distribution to be implementable asymptotically (i.e, when the number of taken actions grows large) are provided for both causal and non-causal state information at Agent . Since the coordination degree between the agents' actions, and , and the system state is measured in terms of an average payoff function, feasible payoffs…
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