The Problem Of Grue Isn't

TL;DR

The paper argues that the problem of grue is based on a misunderstanding of causation and does not genuinely challenge the rationality of induction or the role of probability in logic.

Contribution

It clarifies the nature of the problem of grue and demonstrates that it arises from misconceptions about causation, dismissing it as a valid challenge to induction.

Findings

The problem of grue is based on a misunderstanding of causation.

The problem does not pose a genuine challenge to induction.

Misinterpretations lead to unnecessary doubts about induction and probability.

Abstract

The so-called problem of grue was introduced by Nelson Goodman in 1954 as a "riddle" about induction, a riddle which has been widely thought to cast doubt on the validity and rationality of induction. That unnecessary doubt in turn is partly responsible for the reluctance to adopt the view that probability is part of logic. Several authors have pointed out deficiencies in grue; nevertheless, the "problem" still excites. Here, adapted from Groarke, is presented the basis of grue, along with another simple demonstration that the "problem" makes no sense and is brought about by a misunderstanding of causation.