Verifiable Elections with Commitment Consistent Encryption -- A Primer

TL;DR

This paper introduces the PPATS Commitment Consistent Encryption scheme and discusses its application in creating end-to-end verifiable elections that maintain voter privacy even under severe security breaches.

Contribution

It presents an overview of a novel encryption scheme that ensures vote privacy and verifiability in elections, resilient to key compromise and cryptographic failures.

Findings

Provides a scheme that guarantees vote privacy even if all private keys are compromised.

Ensures election verifiability without leaking any vote information.

Supports secure and private election audits.

Abstract

This note provides an introduction to the PPATS Commitment Consistent Encryption (CCE) scheme proposed by Cuvelier, Pereira and Peters and its use in the design of end-to-end verifiable elections with a perfectly private audit trail. These elections can be verified using audit data that will never leak any information about the vote, even if all the private keys of the elections are compromised, or if the cryptographic assumptions are broken.