Epistemological and Ontological Paraconsistency in Quantum Mechanics: For and Against Bohrian Philosophy

TL;DR

This paper explores the philosophical implications of quantum superpositions, proposing that their apparent contradictions may be ontological rather than merely epistemological, through the lens of paraconsistency and Bohr's complementarity.

Contribution

It introduces the idea that quantum superpositions can be interpreted as ontological contradictions, extending paraconsistent logic into the ontological realm of quantum mechanics.

Findings

Quantum superpositions may be ontologically contradictory.

Paraconsistent logic can be applied to interpret quantum phenomena.

Supports a radical ontological view of quantum mechanics.

Abstract

We interpret the philosophy of Niels Bohr as related to the so called "linguistic turn" and consider paraconsistency in the light of the Bohrian notion of complementarity. Following [16], Jean-Yves Beziau has discussed the seemingly contradictory perspectives found in the quantum mechanical double slit experiment in terms of paraconsistent view-points [7, 8]. This interpretation goes in line with the well known Bohrian Neo-Kantian epistemological account of quantum mechanics. In the present paper, we put forward the idea that one can also consider, within quantum mechanics and departing from the philosophy of the danish physicist, a more radical paraconsistency found within one of the main formal elements of the theory, namely, quantum superpositions. We will argue that, rather than epistemological, the contradictions found within quantum superpositions could be interpreted as ontological contradictions.