Defeating jamming with the power of silence: a game-theoretic analysis

TL;DR

This paper models the strategic interaction between communication nodes using timing channels and a jammer through game theory, analyzing equilibrium strategies to enhance resilience against jamming attacks.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for timing channels against jamming, analyzing Nash and Stackelberg equilibria with practical insights.

Findings

Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness are established.

Timing channels can effectively mitigate jamming under certain strategies.

Numerical results demonstrate the impact of network parameters on resilience.

Abstract

The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel has been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by an energy-constrained malicious node. In fact, whilst a jammer is able to disrupt the information contained in the attacked packets, timing information cannot be jammed and, therefore, timing channels can be exploited to deliver information to the receiver even on a jammed channel. Since the nodes under attack and the jammer have conflicting interests, their interactions can be modeled by means of game theory. Accordingly, in this paper a game-theoretic model of the interactions between nodes exploiting the timing channel to achieve resilience to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is studied in the terms of existence, uniqueness, and convergence under best response dynamics. Furthermore, the case in which the communication nodes set their strategy and the jammer reacts accordingly is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg game, by considering both perfect and imperfect knowledge of the jammer's utility function. Extensive numerical results are presented, showing the impact of network parameters on the system performance.