A Nested Family of $k$-total Effective Rewards for Positional Games
Endre Boros, Khaled Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new family of effective reward functions called $k$-total for positional games, extending known reward concepts and establishing fundamental properties like saddle points and strategy optimality.
Contribution
It defines the $k$-total reward functions for deterministic stochastic games and proves the existence of saddle points with optimal strategies, also showing how these games embed into higher-order reward games.
Findings
Existence of saddle points with pure stationary strategies.
Embedding of $k$-total reward games into $(k+1)$-total reward games.
Extension of reward concepts from mean payoff and total reward to a nested family.
Abstract
We consider Gillette's two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each we introduce an effective reward function, called -total. For and this function is known as {\it mean payoff} and {\it total reward}, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case. For all , we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be realized by uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies. We also demonstrate that -total reward games can be embedded into -total reward games.
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Taxonomy
TopicsInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Game Theory and Applications · Probabilistic and Robust Engineering Design
