On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games
Xi Chen, David Durfee, Anthi Orfanou
TL;DR
This paper proves that computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in anonymous games with seven strategies is computationally hard (PPAD-complete) when the approximation is very precise, highlighting the complexity of such game-theoretic problems.
Contribution
It establishes the PPAD-completeness of finding approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games with seven strategies for exponentially small approximation parameters.
Findings
PPAD-completeness for seven-strategy anonymous games
Hardness results for exponentially small approximation parameters
Complexity classification of equilibrium computation
Abstract
We show that the problem of finding an {\epsilon}-approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter {\epsilon} is exponentially small in the number of players.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Economic theories and models