Location Verification Systems for VANETs in Rician Fading Channels
Shihao Yan, Robert Malaney, Ido Nevat, and Gareth W. Peters

TL;DR
This paper develops and analyzes location verification systems for VANETs operating in Rician fading channels, providing insights into optimal attack strategies, performance limits, and the impact of tracking information for detecting malicious vehicles.
Contribution
It introduces a formal analysis of LVS performance in Rician channels, including optimal attack strategies and the independence of performance limits from malicious channel properties.
Findings
LVS performance limit is independent of malicious vehicle's channel properties above a certain antenna threshold.
Tracking information significantly improves LVS detection performance.
Optimal LVS performance is achieved with random tracking length assumptions.
Abstract
In this work we propose and examine Location Verification Systems (LVSs) for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) in the realistic setting of Rician fading channels. In our LVSs, a single authorized Base Station (BS) equipped with multiple antennas aims to detect a malicious vehicle that is spoofing its claimed location. We first determine the optimal attack strategy of the malicious vehicle, which in turn allows us to analyze the optimal LVS performance as a function of the Rician -factor of the channel between the BS and a legitimate vehicle. Our analysis also allows us to formally prove that the LVS performance limit is independent of the properties of the channel between the BS and the malicious vehicle, provided the malicious vehicle's antenna number is above a specified value. We also investigate how tracking information on a vehicle quantitatively improves the detection…
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