Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information: the dependent case
Fabien Gensbittel (GREMAQ), Miquel Oliu-Barton (CEREMADE)

TL;DR
This paper extends duality techniques to identify optimal strategies in finitely repeated games with incomplete information, accounting for dependent types, thus broadening the scope beyond the independent case.
Contribution
It generalizes the duality approach and strategy construction to handle dependent types in repeated incomplete information games.
Findings
Extended duality techniques for dependent types
Constructed optimal strategies for dependent case
Broadened applicability of previous methods
Abstract
Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (1996a, 1996b), De Meyer and Marino (2005) provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with incomplete information on two sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the case of general type dependence.
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Variational Analysis · Stochastic processes and financial applications · Economic theories and models
