Vaccination and public trust: a model for the dissemination of vaccination behavior with external intervention
A. D. Medus, C. O. Dorso

TL;DR
This paper presents an agent-based model to analyze how social network structures and external interventions influence vaccination behavior and outbreak dynamics, highlighting the impact of anti-vaccination movements and public health campaigns.
Contribution
It introduces a novel model combining cultural dissemination and social network analysis to study vaccination behavior and outbreak risk, including the effects of external campaigns.
Findings
Anti-vaccination movements increase unvaccinated clusters.
Public health campaigns can mitigate anti-vaccination effects.
Network topology influences outbreak size and cluster formation.
Abstract
Vaccination is widely recognized as the most effective way of immunization against many infectious diseases. However, unfounded claims about supposed side effects of some vaccines have contributed to spread concern and fear among people, thus inducing vaccination refusal. For instance, MMR vaccine coverage has undergone an important decrease in a large part of Europe and US as a consequence of erroneously alleged side effects, leading to recent measles outbreaks. In this work, we propose a general agent-based model to study the spread of vaccination behavior in social networks, not as an isolated binary opinion spreading on it, but as part of a process of cultural dissemination in the spirit of Axelrod's model. We particularly focused on the impact of a small anti-vaccination movement over an initial population of pro-vaccination social agents. Additionally, we have considered two…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
