Modal Extensions of {\L}ukasiewicz Logic for Modeling Coalitional Power

TL;DR

This paper extends {\

Contribution

It introduces modal extensions of {\

Findings

Completeness theorems for the new modal logics

Generalization of effectivity functions to many-valued logic

Framework for modeling coalitional power with degrees of effectivity

Abstract

Modal logics for reasoning about the power of coalitions capture the notion of effectivity functions associated with game forms. The main goal of coalition logics is to provide formal tools for modeling the dynamics of a game frame whose states may correspond to different game forms. The two classes of effectivity functions studied are the families of playable and truly playable effectivity functions, respectively. In this paper we generalize the concept of effectivity function beyond the yes/no truth scale. This enables us to describe the situations in which the coalitions assess their effectivity in degrees, based on functions over the outcomes taking values in a finite {\L}ukasiewicz chain. Then we introduce two modal extensions of {\L}ukasiewicz finite-valued logic together with many-valued neighborhood semantics in order to encode the properties of many-valued effectivity functions associated with game forms. As our main results we prove completeness theorems for the two newly introduced modal logics.