Opinion Dynamics with Confirmation Bias
A.E. Allahverdyan, Aram Galstyan

TL;DR
This paper introduces a non-Bayesian model of opinion revision that captures confirmation bias and related social phenomena, providing insights into persuasion effects and cognitive dissonance.
Contribution
It presents a novel non-Bayesian framework for modeling opinion change under confirmation bias, aligning with psychological phenomena and extending beyond traditional Bayesian approaches.
Findings
The model reproduces primacy and recency effects.
It explains the boomerang effect and cognitive dissonance.
The model's convergence properties are analyzed.
Abstract
Background: Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or evaluate new information in a way that is consistent with one's preexisting beliefs. It is omnipresent in psychology, economics, and even scientific practices. Prior theoretical research of this phenomenon has mainly focused on its economic implications possibly missing its potential connections with broader notions of cognitive science. Methodology/Principal Findings: We formulate a (non-Bayesian) model for revising subjective probabilistic opinion of a confirmationally-biased agent in the light of a persuasive opinion. The revision rule ensures that the agent does not react to persuasion that is either far from his current opinion or coincides with it. We demonstrate that the model accounts for the basic phenomenology of the social judgment theory, and allows to study various phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and…
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