A continuous auction model with insiders and random time of information release

TL;DR

This paper models a continuous auction market with insiders and random information release times, analyzing equilibrium strategies and market efficiency under different insider knowledge scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces a unified framework for equilibrium analysis with insiders knowing or not knowing the random information release time, extending previous models.

Findings

Market is fully efficient when insiders know the release time.

Prices become more stable as the announcement approaches when insiders do not know the release time.

Equilibrium strategies depend on insider information and timing uncertainty.

Abstract

In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset. The fundamental value itself is announced at a future random (stopping) time. We consider two cases. First when the release time of information is known to the insider and then when it is unknown also to her. Allowing for very general dynamics, we study the structure of the insider's optimal strategies in equilibrium and we discuss market efficiency. In particular, we show that in the case the insider knows the information release time, the market is fully efficient. In the case the insider does not know this random time, we see that there is an equilibrium with no full efficiency, but where the sensitivity of prices is decreasing in time according with the probability that the announcement time is greater than the current time. In other words, the prices become more and more stable as the announcement approaches.