Social consensus and tipping points with opinion inertia
C. Doyle, S. Sreenivasan, B. K. Szymanski, and G. Korniss

TL;DR
This paper explores how opinion inertia or stickiness affects the spread and tipping points of opinions in different network topologies, revealing that stickiness influences critical minority sizes and coarsening dynamics.
Contribution
It introduces a model where opinion stickiness impacts opinion dynamics, providing analytical bounds and simulation results across various network structures.
Findings
Opinion stickiness increases the critical minority size needed for tipping.
Stickiness induces an effective surface tension, affecting coarsening behavior.
Analytical bounds for critical minority size are derived for complete graphs.
Abstract
When opinions, behaviors or ideas diffuse within a population, some are invariably stickier than others. The stickier the opinion, behavior or idea, the greater is an individual's inertia to replace it with an alternative. Here we study the effect of stickiness of opinions in a two-opinion model, where individuals change their opinion only after a certain number of consecutive encounters with the alternative opinion. Assuming that one opinion has a fixed stickiness, we investigate how the critical size of the competing opinion required to tip over the entire population varies as a function of the competing opinion's stickiness. We analyze this scenario for the case of a complete-graph topology through simulations, and through a semi-analytical approach which yields an upper bound for the critical minority size. We present analogous simulation results for the case of the…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
