Information Sharing for Strong Neutrals on Social Networks - Exact Solutions for Consensus Times

TL;DR

This paper models the role of strong neutrals in social networks using modified voter and naming game models, providing exact solutions for consensus times through mathematical analysis.

Contribution

It introduces a novel mathematical framework for analyzing strong neutrals in social networks, deriving closed-form solutions for consensus times in modified voter and naming game models.

Findings

Closed-form expressions for eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the modified models.

Exact calculations of expected consensus and local times.

Application of models to social forums and blogs.

Abstract

To analyze the nuances of the root concept of neutral in social networks, we focus on several related interpretations and suggest corresponding mathematical models for each of them from the family of information-sharing multi-agents network games known as Voter models and the Naming Games (NG). We solve the case of the strong neutrals known as the middle-roaders for global quantities such as expected times to consensus and local times. By using generating functions and treating the two extreme and middle opinions in this modification as a two balls, three urns version of the Voter model, we give closed-form expressions for the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of its Markov propagator. This modification of the two-opinions Naming Games is applicable to the roles and behaviour of neutrals in social forums or blogs, and represent a significant departure from the linguistic roots of the original NG.